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THE AD HOC FEDERAL CRIME OF 
TERRORISM: WHY CONGRESS NEEDS TO 
AMEND THE STATUTE TO ADEQUATELY 
ADDRESS DOMESTIC EXTREMISM 
NATHAN CARPENTER† 
INTRODUCTION 
On August 11, 2017, hundreds of white nationalists, carrying 
torches and chanting racist epithets, violently engaged with 
counter-protesters in Charlottesville, Virginia.1  The next day, 
many of those same individuals marched throughout 
Charlottesville and clashed with counter-demonstrators again.2  
During this “extremist demonstration turned violent,” one 
individual killed a counter-protester and injured nineteen others 
by driving his vehicle into a crowd.3 
On September 6, 2017, Congress issued Senate Joint 
Resolution 49 (“Joint Resolution”), condemning the “racist 
violence and domestic terror attack” that took place in 
Charlottesville, expressing concern for similar extremism in 
other cities and “the growing and open display of hate and 
violence being perpetrated by [white nationalist] groups.”4  The 
Joint Resolution also called on the Trump Administration to 
curtail the threat posed by domestic extremist groups.5  Finally, 
the Joint Resolution called on the Attorney General “to 
investigate thoroughly all acts of violence, intimidation, and 
domestic terrorism by White supremacists . . . and associated 
groups[,] . . . to improve the reporting of hate crimes and to 
emphasize the importance of the collection, and the 
reporting . . . of hate crime data by State and local agencies.”6 
 
† Senior Staff, St. John’s Law Review, J.D. Candidate 2019, St. John’s 
University School of Law; B.A., DePaul University..  
1 S.J. Res. 49, 105th Cong. (2017). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
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However, what many do not realize is that the act carried 
out by the neo-Nazi sympathizer in Charlottesville does not 
constitute terrorism under federal law.7  Terrorism is not an 
explicit charge under federal law,8 but a specific act can 
constitute the federal crime of terrorism if it is “intended to help 
bring about, encourage, or contribute to” an offense specifically 
listed in § 2332b(g)(5) (“the federal crime of terrorism statute”).9  
These offenses include providing material support to terrorists,10 
bombing public places,11 and various crimes relating to 
government property, air travel, and naval equipment, among 
other things.12  The act also must be “calculated to influence or 
affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or 
to retaliate against government conduct”13 in order to expose a 
defendant to various investigatory and legal mechanisms meant 
to deter such actions and prevent future harms.14  The alleged 
 
7 The defendant was charged with second degree murder, three counts of 
malicious wounding, and one count of hit and run. Id. None of these charges are 
listed in acts that may constitute the federal crime of terrorism. See 
18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b(g)(5) (West 2015). 
8 Greg Myre, Why the Government Can’t Bring Terrorism Charges in 
Charlottesville, NPR (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/08/14/543462676/ 
why-the-govt-cant-bring-terrorism-charges-in-charlottesville. 
9 See United States v. Awan, 607 F.3d 306, 314 (2d Cir. 2010); see also United 
States v. Fidse, 778 F.3d 477, 481 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that the defendant must 
have “one purpose of his substantive count of conviction or his relevant conduct the 
intent to promote a federal crime of terrorism”) (citation omitted). An act must 
transcend national boundaries in order to be charged under 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b, but 
an offense specified in 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b(g)(5) does not have to transcend 
boundaries for the investigatory and deterrence purposes discussed in this Note. See 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI 
OPERATIONS 18 (2008) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES]; U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 cmt. n.4 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2002) [hereinafter SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL]. 
10 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2012); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B (West 2015). 
11 18 U.S.C. § 2332f (2012). 
12 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b(g)(5). 
13 United States v. Harris, 434 F.3d 767, 773 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting 
18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)). 
14 See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 23. A federal crime of 
terrorism charge allows for an enterprise investigation into “any relationship of the 
group to a foreign power, its size and composition, its geographic dimensions and 
finances, its past acts and goals, and its capacity for harm.” Id. at 18; see also 
18 U.S.C. § 3286(b) (2012) (providing that there is no statute of limitations if a 
federal crime of terrorism results in death); 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(j) (West 2015) 
(providing that there is also no limitation on the supervised release period of a 
person convicted of a federal crime of terrorism). “If the offense is a felony that 
involved, or was intended to promote, a federal crime of terrorism, increase by 12 
levels; but if the resulting offense level is less than level 32, increase to level 32.” 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 9, at § 3A1.4(a). “In each such case, 
2018] ADDRESSING DOMESTIC EXTREMISM 395 
murder in Charlottesville does not fall within any of the specific 
crimes because the statute does not list murder or hate crimes as 
acts that may constitute terrorism.15  This means that the event 
will not trigger mechanisms available for terrorism-related cases. 
This Note argues that Congress should add such crimes to 
the list specified in the federal crime of terrorism statute and 
amend the statute’s intent requirement.  This will allow the 
Department of Justice to more adequately use its resources to 
address the growing prevalence of hate groups, increase 
investigatory capabilities, and emphasize the threat posed by 
such groups.  Part I explores the current federal crime of 
terrorism and analyzes how various terrorism-related cases are 
adjudicated.  Part II introduces the prevailing threat of political 
extremists operating within the United States and shows that 
they should no longer be placed in a separate legal framework.  
Part III looks at state terrorism laws as a guideline for possible 
changes to federal terrorism law.  Finally, Part IV introduces 
amendments to domestic terrorism statutes and addresses any 
perceived issues with the recommended changes. 
I. TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ARBITRARY 
DISTINCTION 
This section explores the legal framework surrounding 
domestic terrorism and examines acts that fall within the federal 
crime of terrorism and acts that do not.  All of these acts are 
outlawed by current federal law but not all of them elicit the 
legal mechanisms that accompany a terrorism charge.  Amending 
the federal crime of terrorism to include murder and hate crimes 
will allow all of these acts to be eligible for the terrorism 
designation. 
A. Murder Is Not Enough To Bring a Crime Within the Legal 
Terrorism Framework 
The United States Code defines domestic terrorism as 
“activities that involve acts dangerous to human life 
that . . . appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian 
population; to influence the policy of a government by 
intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government 
 
the defendant's criminal history category from Chapter Four (Criminal History and 
Criminal Livelihood) shall be Category VI.” Id. at § 3A1.4(b). 
15 See 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5). 
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by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping . . . .”16  This 
definition was created to strengthen “surveillance powers and 
government authority to conduct intelligence-gathering 
operations in matters of suspected terrorism, as well as [to allow] 
for the civil seizure of assets based only on probable cause, and 
heightened punishments for any of the underlying crimes . . . .”17  
A defendant cannot be charged with terrorism under federal 
law.18  Instead, specific offenses when paired with the requisite 
intent are designated to constitute the federal crime of terrorism 
for sentencing and investigatory purposes.19  When a defendant 
performs or attempts a federal crime of terrorism, the FBI 
initiates an enterprise investigation that looks into possible co-
conspirators or groups with which the defendant may be 
involved, as well as any capacity for future harm from the 
defendant’s associates.20  If Congress expands the federal crime of 
terrorism, the law will properly encompass crimes by domestic 
extremists, such as the one in Charlottesville. 
Currently, the only way that a wholly domestic extremist, 
such as the alleged murderer in Charlottesville, can be subject to 
the various investigatory and legal mechanisms provided by the 
domestic terrorism framework is if he “intended to help bring 
about, encourage, or contribute to a federal crime of terrorism as 
that term is defined” by statute.21  This expands the statutory 
definition slightly to include offenses such as obstructing an 
investigation of a federal crime of terrorism22 and criminal 
contempt,23 but if the defendant is convicted of an offense that is 
not specifically enumerated in the statute, the district court 
“must identify which enumerated federal crime of terrorism the 
defendant intended to promote, satisfy the elements of [the 
federal crime of terrorism statute], and support its conclusions by 
a preponderance of the evidence with facts from the record.”24  
The defendant’s conduct also must be found to be “calculated to 
 
16 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (2012). 
17 Sudha Setty, What's in a Name? How Nations Define Terrorism Ten Years 
After 9/11, 33 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1, 23–24 (2011). 
18 Myre, supra note 8. 
19 See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 9, at § 3A1.4. 
20 See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES, supra note 9. 
21 See United States v. Awan, 607 F.3d 306, 314 (2d Cir. 2010); see also United 
States v. Fidse, 778 F.3d 477, 481 (5th Cir. 2015). 
22 See United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 311 (4th Cir. 2008). 
23 See United States v. Ashqar, 582 F.3d 819, 825 (7th Cir. 2009). 
24 Fidse, 778 F.3d at 481 (quoting United States v. Arnaout 431 F.3d 994, 1002 
(7th Cir. 2005)). 
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influence or affect the government’s conduct by intimidation or 
coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct.”25  This 
narrow definition leaves many violent acts by domestic 
extremists outside of the federal terrorism framework. 
Although violent crime rates in the United States have 
dropped since the 1990s,26 there is no shortage of high profile 
crimes covered by the national media and condemned by the 
federal government.27  Some of these crimes are immediately 
categorized as terrorism,28 while other similar crimes are never 
given the designation.29  The current ad hoc approach to what can 
and cannot constitute the federal crime of terrorism creates a 
discrepancy that leaves many Americans wondering why certain 
horrific events, with multiple casualties, are categorized as 
terrorism while others are not. 
B. Acts Considered Terrorism Under Current Law 
The federal crime of terrorism encompasses the use of 
explosives, attempts to recruit individuals to carry out acts in the 
name of a foreign terrorist organization, and acting in accordance 
with a doctrine of self-radicalization promoted by an extremist 
group.30  The commission of a crime under the federal crime of 
terrorism statute allows the FBI to engage in a special 
investigation.31  The investigation examines the activity of the 
group involved in order to determine “any relationship of the 
group to a foreign power, its size and composition, its geographic 
dimensions and finances, its past acts and goals, and its capacity 
 
25 United States v. Harris, 434 F.3d 767, 773 (5th Cir. 2005). 
26 John Gramlich, 5 Facts About Crime in the U.S., PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 30, 
2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/30/5-facts-about-crime-in-the-
u-s/. 
27 See Transcript and Video: President Trump Speaks About Charlottesville, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/us/politics/trans 
cript-and-video-president-trump-speaks-about-charlottesville.html?_r=0; President 
Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Closing of the Summit on Countering 
Violent Extremism (Feb. 18, 2015) (transcript available at https://obamawhite 
house.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/18/remarks-president-closing-summit-
countering-violent-extremism). 
28 See President Barack Obama, Address to the Nation by the President (Dec. 6, 
2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/12/06/address-nat 
ion-president. 
29 See Transcript and Video: President Trump Speaks About Charlottesville, 
supra note 27. 
30 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b(g)(5)(B) (West 2015). 
31 See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES, supra note 9. 
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for harm.”32  The investigation also determines “the identity and 
relationship of its members, employees, or other persons who 
may be acting in furtherance of its objectives.”33 
An act can trigger these investigatory mechanisms when the 
defendant chooses to use a specific method or weapon listed in 
the federal crime of terrorism statute.34  On October 14, 2016, the 
Department of Justice filed a criminal complaint against Curtis 
Wayne Allen, Patrick Eugene Stein, and Gavin Wayne Wright, 
alleging that the defendants conspired to use a weapon of mass 
destruction.35  The defendants were members of an organization 
known as the Crusaders, which has “anti-government, anti-
Muslim, and anti-immigrant extremist beliefs,” and were 
planning an attack on a Muslim community in Kansas.36  
Fortunately, authorities were able to apprehend these men 
before they were able to carry out their attack.  Use of a weapon 
of mass destruction or conspiracy to do so is outlawed by federal 
law and constitutes the federal crime of terrorism,37 so this 
charge triggered investigatory mechanisms by the FBI allowing 
the Crusaders to be investigated further.38  If the defendants 
were not planning to use a bomb to carry out their attack, the 
conduct would not have been considered a federal crime of 
terrorism. 
A terrorism-related charge can also apply if a defendant 
attempts to recruit others to commit acts of terror.39  On August 
17, 2016, Erick Jamal Hendricks was indicted on conspiracy to 
provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization.40  
The Government monitored Hendricks’ social media profiles and 
used confidential informants to build a case against Hendricks.41  
Using this evidence, the Government alleged that Hendricks “has 
some connection to the attempted terrorist attack in Garland, 
Texas on May 3, 2015 . . . [and] recruited other individuals to join 
 
32 Id.  
33 Id. at 23. 
34 Id.  
35 See Sealed Criminal Complaint, United States v. Allen, No. 16-M-6151-GEB 
(D. Kan. Oct. 14, 2016). 
36 Id. 
37 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b(g)(5)(B) (West 2015). 
38 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 23. 
39 Id.  
40 United States v. Hendricks, No. 1:16CR265, 2016 WL 4708631, at *1 (N.D. 
Ohio Sept. 17, 2016); see 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a)–(b) (West 2015); id. 
§ 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i) (West 2015). 
41 Hendricks, 2016 WL 4708631, at *3. 
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together in coordinated terrorist attacks.”42  Hendricks claimed to 
“have ten operatives in the United States and hoped to raid 
military depots for weapons.”43  Hendricks also told FBI 
informants that “he worked full-time as a recruiter.”44  Providing 
material support to terrorists is a crime enumerated in the 
federal crime of terrorism statute,45 so all of Hendricks’ contacts 
and possible affiliates were likely investigated as well. 
A crime can fall within the federal crime of terrorism if the 
defendant is inspired by Islamic extremist groups.46  On October 
31, 2017, Sayfullo Saipov allegedly killed eight people when he 
drove a vehicle down a crowded bike path.47  The defendant told 
law enforcement that “[h]e was inspired by 90 graphic and 
violent propaganda videos found on his phone—in particular, one 
in which [Islamic State] leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi asks what 
Muslims are doing to avenge deaths in Iraq.”48  The defendant 
was said to have “followed almost exactly to a ‘T’ [Islamic State] 
instructions on how to carry out such an attack.”49  Since he was 
charged with providing material support which constitutes the 
federal crime of terrorism,50 the FBI will investigate whether 
Saipov was connected to any groups or individuals that may be 
planning similar attacks or attempting to radicalize other 
individuals.  If the defendant was motivated by the neo-Nazi 
ideology of a domestic extremist group, like the alleged murderer 
in Charlottesville, the conduct would not fall within the current 
federal terrorism law. 
Bringing charges specified in the federal crime of terrorism 
statute allows the FBI to investigate any individual or group 
connected to a given defendant’s activity.51  This helps curtail any  
 
 
42 Id.; see Holly Yan, Texas Attack: What We Know About Elton Simpson and 
Nadir Soofi, CNN (May 5, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/05/us/texas-shooting-
gunmen/index.html. 
43 Mark Washburn & Tim Funk, Man in Charlotte Accused of Recruiting for 
Islamic State, Planning Training Compound, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Aug. 4, 2016), 
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/crime/article93679667.html. 
44 Id. 
45 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i). 
46 Id. 
47 New York Truck Attack Suspect ‘Spent a Year Planning’, BBC NEWS (Nov. 2, 
2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-41835266. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i). 
51 See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 23. 
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future threats posed by people connected to the defendant.  These 
charges also are eligible for a sentencing enhancement52 and 
carry a greater societal significance than other charges. 
C. Acts Ineligible for the Federal Crime of Terrorism 
Not all federal crimes can constitute the federal crime of 
terrorism, even if the defendant intended to intimidate or coerce 
a civilian population or the government.53  There is no doubt that 
the American public and the government want to deter acts of 
this nature.54  Law enforcement acknowledges that crimes of this 
nature are a danger to the American public,55 and the 
government has mechanisms in place for addressing such 
threats.56  However, many violent acts by domestic extremists do 
not trigger the more extensive measures that exist within the 
federal terrorism framework to deter crimes of terrorism and 
allow for more effective investigations.57  The statutory 
framework needs to be amended to ensure that violent acts by 
domestic extremists can be adjudicated within it, thus triggering 
antiterrorism investigatory procedures when necessary. 
Under the current statutory framework, a defendant with a 
long history of participation in domestic hate groups was not 
eligible for a charge specified in the federal crime of terrorism 
statute when he shot and killed three individuals based on his 
anti-Semitic views.58  On April 13, 2014, Frazier Glenn Cross, Jr., 
also known as Frazier Glenn Miller, killed two people at a Jewish 
community center and another woman in the parking lot of a 
 
52 See SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 9, at § 3A1.4. 
53 See 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i). 
54 See Letter from U.S. Senate, to Elaine Duke, Acting Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec. (Aug. 18, 2017), available at https://www.leahy.senate.gov/imo/ 
media/doc/081817%20Letter%20to%20Acting%20Secretary%20Duke.pdf; S.J. Res. 
49, 105th Cong. (2017). 
55 Charles Kurzman & David Schanzer, Law Enforcement Assessment of the 
Violent Extremism Threat, TRIANGLE CTR. ON TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SEC. 3 
(June 25, 2015), https://sites.duke.edu/tcths/files/2013/06/Kurzman_Schanzer_Law_ 
Enforcement_Assessment_of_the_Violent_Extremist_Threat_final.pdf.  
56 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING 
VIOLENT EXTREMISM (2016) 
57 See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 23; 
18 U.S.C. § 3286(b) (2012) (noting that there is no statute of limitations if a federal 
crime of terrorism results in death); 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(j) (West 2015) (noting that 
there is also no limitation on supervised release period following the conviction of a 
federal crime of terrorism). 
58 Second Amended Complaint, State v. Cross, No. 14CR853 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Oct. 
17, 2014). 
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nearby Jewish retirement home in Overland Park, Kansas.59  
Cross had a history of white supremacist views and was 
described as a “pioneer[] in the modern hate world.”60  Cross 
targeted these individuals because of their presence at the 
community center, for he claimed that he wanted to prevent “a 
genocide by Jews.”61  Although Cross intended to intimidate or 
coerce a civilian population, his slaying of three people did not 
constitute terrorism because he chose to use a gun instead of a 
bomb.62  Instead, Cross was convicted of capital murder,63 which 
made him eligible for the death penalty, but did not trigger the 
legal mechanisms that accompany a terrorism-related charge.64  
If Cross were charged with a crime specified in the federal crime 
of terrorism statute, the FBI would have easily been able to 
investigate any existing ties to hate groups, including the 
structure of those groups, and the likelihood of further violence 
by members of those groups.65 
The need for statutory amendment also was illustrated when 
a defendant that targeted a health clinic based on his political or 
religious views similarly fell outside of the federal crime of 
terrorism.  On November 27, 2015, Robert Lewis Dear, Jr. killed 
three people and injured nine more at a Planned Parenthood 
clinic in Colorado Springs, Colorado.66  The defendant was found 
to be a supporter of a group known as the Army of God, which 
“has claimed responsibility for a number of killings and 
bombings.”67  Dear was said to have developed his hatred for 
abortion based on his “religious views.”68  However, before Dear 
 
59 Id. 
60 Ed Payne, Frazier Glenn Cross ‘Entrenched in the Hate World’, CNN (Aug. 31, 
2015), https://www.cnn.com/2014/04/14/us/kansas-shooting-suspect-profile/index. 
html. 
61 Jury To Begin Penalty Phase of Frazier Glenn Cross Trial Tuesday, KMBC 
NEWS (Aug. 31, 2015), http://www.kmbc.com/article/jury-to-begin-penalty-phase-of-
frazier-glenn-cross-trial-tuesday/3690250. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. Capital murder is not a crime specifically enumerated under 
18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i). See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b(g)(5) (West 2015). 
64 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 23. 
65 Id.  
66 See Sadie Gurman, Suspect in Colorado Clinic Attack Will Face Murder 
Charges, MIAMI HERALD (Nov. 30, 2015), http://www.miamiherald.com/latest-news/ 
article47206975.html. 
67 Richard Fausset, For Robert Dear, Religion and Rage Before Planned 
Parenthood Attack, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/02/ 
us/robert-dear-planned-parenthood-shooting.html. 
68 Id. 
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was deemed mentally incompetent to stand trial, he was charged 
only with first degree murder, so the investigative and 
retributive mechanisms accompanied by a federal terrorism 
charge did not apply to Dear.69  If the FBI charged Dear with a 
federal crime of terrorism, it could further investigate his 
connections to the Army of God, including any attacks that the 
group may be planning. 
Finally, a defendant self-radicalized by white supremacist 
propaganda who killed nine people based on their race yet did 
not come within the federal terrorism framework is another 
example of why the framework needs to be changed.  On June 17, 
2015, Dylann Roof killed nine people and injured another at 
Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, 
South Carolina.70  Roof intentionally targeted the historic 
African-American church due to his white supremacist beliefs 
and motivation to start a “race war.”71  Although some would 
argue that Roof committed an act of terrorism, he was found 
guilty on federal hate crime charges.72  Even though Roof was 
described as “self-radicalized,” and government officials said that 
his actions were “consistent with the concept of leaderless 
resistance and martyrdom advocated by white supremacy 
extremist groups and self-radicalization leading to violence,”73 he 
was not eligible for a charge under the current federal crime of 
terrorism statute. 
The legal mechanisms established by the terrorism 
framework should be activated when the defendant intends to 
intimidate or coerce a civilian population or the government.  The 
inquiry should not hinge on the weapon used or the target 
chosen.  Each of these acts should fall within the federal 
terrorism framework.  This would not only initiate legal 
mechanisms, but it would also achieve much of what Congress  
 
 
69 Gurman, supra note 66; see SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 9, 
at § 3A1.4. 
70 Ray Sanchez & Ed Payne, Charleston Church Shooting: Who is Dylann Roof?, 
CNN (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2015/06/19/us/charleston-church-shooting 
-suspect/index.html. 
71 Id. 
72 See generally Jesse J. Norris, Why Dylann Roof is a Terrorist under Federal 
Law, and Why It Matters, 54 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 259 (2017). 
73 Associated Press, Church Shooting Suspect Dylann Roof Was ‘Self-
Radicalized,’ Authorities Say, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/ 
nation/nationnow/la-na-dylann-roof-church-shooter-20160823-snap-story.html#. 
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sought in the Joint Resolution by signaling to law enforcement 
and the public that domestic extremists are a considerable threat 
to public safety that should not be viewed in isolation. 
II. CURRENT FEDERAL LAW DOES NOT APPRECIATE THE THREAT 
POSED BY DOMESTIC EXTREMISM 
This section explores the threat of domestic extremists 
operating within the United States.  For the purposes of this 
Note, extremist ideologies are broken down into three groups: 
Islamic extremism, far-left extremism, and far-right extremism.  
The University of Maryland Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Reponses to Terrorism (“START”) defines Islamic 
extremists generally as “those who profess[] some form of belief 
in or allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), al-
Qa’ida, or other (radical) Islamist-associated terrorist entities.”74  
START defines leftist extremists as those holding “extremist 
environmental beliefs, extremist ‘animal liberation’ beliefs, or 
extremist far left beliefs.”75  Further, right-wing extremism is 
defined as “that which is motivated by a variety of far right 
ideologies and beliefs, generally favoring social hierarchy and 
seeking an idealized future favoring a particular group” including 
“white supremacists and antigovernment militias.”76  The federal 
government focuses heavily on the threat posed by Islamic 
extremists. 
Since the attacks on September 11, 2001, Islamic extremism 
continues to be the primary focus of foreign policy and counter-
terrorism efforts.77  Due to the prevalence of foreign terrorist 
organizations, the actions of Islamic extremists have an 
inherently transnational nature that brings them within the 
statutory framework.78  There is no doubt that the threat posed 
 
74 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-300, COUNTERING VIOLENT 
EXTREMISM: ACTIONS NEEDED TO DEFINE STRATEGY AND ASSESS PROGRESS OF 
FEDERAL EFFORTS 29 (2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683984.pdf. 
75 Id. at 28. 
76 Id. at 1. 
77 See Operation Inherent Resolve: Targeted Operations to Defeat ISIS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF DEF., https://www.defense.gov/OIR/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2018). The United 
States and its allies have conducted 24,566 airstrikes in its effort to defeat ISIS. Id. 
Former FBI Director James Comey told Congress that there are “about a thousand 
open investigations on” Islamic State-related extremism. Charles Kurzman, Muslim-
American Involvement with Violent Extremism, 2016, TRIANGLE CTR. ON TERRORISM 
AND HOMELAND SEC. 3 (January 26, 2017), https://sites.duke.edu/tcths/files/2018/ 
01/Kurzman_Muslim-American_Involvement_with_Violent_Extremism_2017.pdf. 
78 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b (West 2015). 
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by Islamic extremists must be taken very seriously; however, 
that does not mean that these groups and individuals should be 
the sole concentration of counterterrorism efforts. 
Domestic extremists present a threat that is comparable to, 
if not greater than, the Islamic extremist groups that seem to 
dominate the rhetoric surrounding terrorism.  Between 2000 and 
2011, violence from far-right groups increased by 400 percent.79  
During the period following September 11th, Islamic extremists 
have killed only seven more individuals than right-wing 
extremists.80  In fact, since September 12, 2001, right-wing 
extremist groups have accounted for seventy-three percent of 
“violent extremist incidents that resulted in death.”81  According 
to the United States Extremist Crime Database, there were no 
attacks since 1990 by persons associated with extreme leftist 
ideologies that resulted in fatalities to non-perpetrators;82 
however, left-wing extremists are still present in the United 
States and said to “engage in crimes such as vandalism, theft, 
the destruction of property, and arson.”83 
A. Violence by Domestic Extremists Is Often Charged as a Hate 
Crime 
It is not illegal to be a member of one of these extremist 
groups,84 and a law that attempted to criminalize such 
membership would be unconstitutional.85  Therefore, there is no 
statute outlawing material support for a domestic terrorist 
group.86  In fact, the federal government does not designate or 
establish official lists of domestic terrorist groups.87  This does 
 
79 Arie Perliger, Challenges from the Sidelines: Understanding America’s Violent 
Far-Right, COMBATING TERRORISM CTR. 87 (November 2012), https://ctc.usma.edu/ 
app/uploads/2013/01/ChallengersFromtheSidelines.pdf.  
80 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 74, at 5. The report notes that 
“41 percent of the deaths attributable to radical Islamist violent extremists 
occurred” during the Orlando night club shooting. Id.  
81 Id. at 4. 
82 Id. 
83 JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42536, THE DOMESTIC 
THREAT: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 11 (2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/ 
terror/R42536.pdf. This Note regularly references right-wing extremists, but the 
suggested changes to the terrorism framework would apply to left-wing extremists 
as well. 
84 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992); United States v. 
Stewart, 65 F.3d 918, 928 (11th Cir. 1995). 
85 Stewart, 65 F.3d at 928. 
86 BJELOPERA, supra note 83, at 9. 
87 Id.  
2018] ADDRESSING DOMESTIC EXTREMISM 405 
not mean that members of these groups cannot commit acts of 
terrorism; it simply means that a member of one of these groups 
must commit an act or conspire to commit an act specifically 
codified in the federal crime of terrorism statute in order to be 
legally deemed a terrorist.88  If a white supremacist shoots nine 
people because of his belief that minorities are inferior, he likely 
will be charged with a hate crime.89 
A hate crime occurs when an individual “attempts to cause 
bodily injury to any person, because of the actual or perceived 
race, color, religion, . . . national origin, gender, sexual 
orientation, gender identity, or disability of any person.”90  This 
broad statute can sometimes encompass activity that many 
would view as terrorism.91  In fact, former Attorney General 
Loretta Lynch described hate crimes as “the original terrorism.”92  
The Dylann Roof case is not the only instance in which a 
perceived terrorist act was ultimately charged as a hate crime. 
In 2011, a white supremacist named Kevin Harpham 
attempted to bomb a parade honoring Dr. Martin Luther King, 
Jr.93  The FBI initially referred to the incident as an act of 
domestic terrorism, but the bureau later shifted the rhetoric 
when Harpham ultimately “pled guilty to committing a federal 
hate crime and attempting to use a weapon of mass 
destruction.”94  It is unclear why the government did not pursue a 
sentencing enhancement under § 3A1.4 when attempting to use a 
weapon of mass destruction is an act specifically codified as a 
federal crime of terrorism.95  Perhaps Harpham’s alleged 
membership in “the neo-Nazi National Alliance,” contact with a 
“leader of a white supremacist group,” and “postings on white 
supremacist websites” made it easier to pursue a charge under 
the hate crime statute, instead of a terrorism enhancement.96  It 
is hard to imagine that a Muslim defendant would have been 
charged with a hate crime under similar circumstances. 
 
88 See United States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 517 (6th Cir. 2001). 
89 See Norris, supra note 72, at 266–67. 
90 18 U.S.C. § 249 (2012). 
91 BJELOPERA, supra note 83, at 6. 
92 Norris, supra note 72, at 267 (quoting Kevin Johnson, Attorney General 
Lynch: ‘Hate Crimes Are the Original Domestic Terrorism’, USA TODAY (June 24, 
2015), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/06/24/loretta-lynch-baptist-
church-birmingham/29238615/). 
93 BJELOPERA, supra note 83, at 7. 
94 Id.  
95 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b (West 2015). 
96 BJELOPERA, supra note 83, at 57. 
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B. A Hate Crime Charge Is Inadequate in Some Cases 
A hate crime conviction brings forth a significant increase in 
sentencing,97 but designating an act of terrorism as a hate crime 
does not send the same message or activate the same 
investigatory mechanisms.98  Former Attorney General Loretta 
Lynch acknowledged that a hate crime charge “may give the 
impression that the government ‘[does]n’t consider those crimes 
as serious.’ ”99  It is important for the public to appreciate the 
seriousness and threat posed by extremists who are willing to 
commit hate crimes.  Perpetrators of hate crimes are often 
viewed as acting entirely on their own,100 but this ignores the 
systematic underground that exists to influence and recruit 
domestic extremists.101  Federal agencies have acknowledged the 
systematic threat presented by domestic extremist groups.102  
Congress has called for these groups to be included within the 
framework and discussion regarding terrorism.103  Adding hate 
crimes to the list of acts specified in the federal crime of 
terrorism statute will trigger investigative procedures by the FBI 
that allow the government to analyze how the defendant was 
radicalized, whether the radicalization is connected to any group 
or individual, and the potential for future harm posed by those 
groups or individuals.104  If a person who commits a hate crime 
can be radicalized in a similar way and commit a similar act, the 
designation given to that act should be no different.  Current 
 
97 18 U.S.C. § 249 (2012). 
98 See Norris, supra note 72, at 267. 
99 Id. (quoting Timothy M. Phelps, Dylann Roof Indicted on Federal Hate-Crime 
Charges in Charleston Church Shooting, L.A. TIMES (July 22, 2015), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-roof-hate-crimes-20150722-story.html) 
(alteration in original). 
100 Noah Bierman et al., Charleston Shooting Suspect Dylann Roof Said to be a 
‘Classic Lone Wolf’, L.A. TIMES (June 20, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-
na-charleston-lone-wolf-20150620-story.html; Mike Brunker et al., Kansas Jewish 
Center Shootings Reveal New Dangers of ‘Lone Wolves’, NBC NEWS (Apr. 16, 2014), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/jewish-center-shootings/kansas-jewish-center-
shootings-reveal-new-dangers-lone-wolves-n81331. 
101 J.M. BERGER, GEORGE WASH. UNIV. PROGRAM ON EXTREMISM, NAZIS VS. ISIS 
ON TWITTER: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF WHITE NATIONALISTS AND ISIS ONLINE 
SOCIAL MEDIA NETWORKS 20 (2016), https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2371/ 
f/downloads/Nazis%20v.%20ISIS%20Final_0.pdf. 
102 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., RIGHTWING EXTREMISM: 
CURRENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CLIMATE FUELING RESURGENCE IN 
RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT (2009), https://fas.org/irp/eprint/rightwing.pdf. 
103 See supra note 54. 
104 See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 23. 
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federal law categorizes terrorism based on the methods used to 
carry out the killings or the target chosen, leaving out some 
violent acts by domestic extremists, while some state laws 
categorize terrorism based on the intention of the defendant to 
intimidate the civilian population or the government, which 
allows for a more comprehensive definition of terrorism.105 
III. STATE TERRORISM LAWS INCLUDE MURDER AS A                   
SPECIFIC ACT 
This section examines state laws that include murder as a 
specific act that may constitute terrorism.  Adding murder as a 
specifically enumerated act allows wholly domestic extremists to 
be included within the terrorism framework without requiring a 
specific method or target as the pivotal factor.  The inquiry 
focuses on the intent of the defendant who committed the act.  
Conversely, adding murder to the federal crime of terrorism 
statute will not indiscriminately expand the definition.  Only 
murders that are intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian 
population or a unit of government will constitute terrorism.  
Thus, the amendment will not bring common crime within the 
terrorism framework. 
A. If Murder Constitutes an Act of Terrorism, Then Acts of 
Domestic Extremists Will Be More Adequately Addressed 
The District of Columbia’s (“D.C.”) terrorism statute includes 
murder and manslaughter as specific acts that may constitute 
terrorism, which allows law enforcement to charge domestic 
extremists with terrorism instead of being prevented from doing 
so by the method used or target chosen by the defendant.  The 
Anti-Terrorism Act of 2002 (“D.C. statute”) is structured 
similarly to federal law, for the D.C. statute specifies certain acts 
that are eligible for the terrorism definition, but the D.C. statute 
includes murder and manslaughter as specific acts that may 
constitute a crime of terrorism.106  The act must also be intended 
to “[i]ntimidate or coerce a significant portion of the civilian 
population . . . ; or [i]nfluence the policy or conduct of a unit of 
government.”107 
 
105 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b (West 2015). 
106 D.C. Code Ann. § 22-3152(8) (West 2001). The statute was a response to the 
attacks on September 11th in which state and local governments felt that they 
needed their own legislation to confront terrorism. Id. 
107 Id. § 22-3152(1). 
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The D.C. statute allows the inquiry to focus on the 
defendant’s intent without the charge hinging on whether his or 
her actions were specifically enumerated in the statute.  In 
August 2012, Floyd Lee Corkins opened fire on an unarmed 
security guard at the Family Research Council.108  Corkins pled 
guilty to terrorism charges and signed a statement saying that 
he “targeted the Family Research Council because of its views, 
including its advocacy against recognition of gay marriage.”109  
The United States Attorney assigned to the case stated that 
“[t]oday’s guilty plea makes clear that using violence to terrorize 
political opponents will not be tolerated.”110  The Corkins case 
shows that an attempted murder intended to send a political 
message is an example of terrorism under these statutes. 
A similar case likely would not be eligible for a charge that 
falls within the federal crime of terrorism.  Corkins did not target 
a unit of government, use a weapon of mass destruction, or have 
a connection to a foreign entity.111  The nexus to terrorism was 
established because Corkins’ actions were an attempt to coerce a 
civilian population or a unit of government.112  A conviction under 
the D.C. statute allows for up to thirty years in prison, which 
brings forth strong condemnation of acts that are intended to 
intimidate or coerce civilians or the government.113 
There may be some concerns that the D.C. statute 
encompasses too much activity, which will dilute the crime of 
terrorism and encompass protected activity.  Congress does not 
want to indiscriminately expand the definition of terrorism to 
include activity that it should not.114  It is unclear if the D.C. 
statute would encompass such activity, but case law shows that 
New York’s similar terrorism statute does not encompass 
ordinary criminal behavior. 
 
108 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Virginia Man Pleads Guilty to Charges 
in Shooting of Security Guard at Family Research Council—Defendant Targeted 
Organization in Planned Attack (Feb. 6, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/ 
virginia-man-pleads-guilty-charges-shooting-security-guard-family-research-council. 
Corkins’ conviction was the first under the statute. Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 D.C. Code Ann. § 22-3152(8) (West 2001). 
114 Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Construction and Application of Federal 
Domestic Terrorism Sentencing Enhancement, U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4, 186 A.L.R. Fed. 147, 
at § 2(a) (2003). 
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B. Murder in the Definition of Terrorism Does Not 
Indiscriminately Expand the Designation 
New York State’s terrorism law allows murder to be 
prosecuted as a crime of terrorism without encompassing 
common crimes such as gang violence.  New York Penal Law 
§ 490 (“New York statute”) defines the crime of terrorism as 
“murder, assassination or kidnapping” done “with intent to 
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; influence the policy of 
a unit of government by intimidation or coercion; or affect the 
conduct of a unit of government.”115 
The law was designed to condemn large terror attacks, but it 
was also created to address and prosecute events like the 1994 
murder on the Brooklyn Bridge.116  In that case, a gunman who 
attcked a van transporting young Jewish students across the 
Brooklyn Bridge was thought to be acting in retaliation for a 
recent attack on Muslims by a Brooklyn-born Jewish man in the 
West Bank.117  The shooting was viewed as an act of terrorism by 
many,118 and the New York Supreme Court alluded to the 
shooting as a means for extending the meaning of the New York 
statute to include “acts of a much smaller scale” than the 
September 11 attacks.119 
However, the New York statute does not extend to more 
common criminal acts such as gang violence.  The New York 
Court of Appeals has found that charging a gang member under 
the terrorism statute was inappropriate because the defendant 
did not intend to intimidate or coerce a civilian population.120  
Although the court stated that “residents of a single apartment 
building to a neighborhood, city, county, state or even a country” 
could constitute a civilian population, the term could not apply 
when the “objective [was] to intimidate or coerce other Mexican-
 
115 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.05 (McKinney 2018). The federal terrorism legislation 
is mentioned in the text of the code, but the legislature felt that “[a] comprehensive 
state law is urgently needed.” Id. § 490.00 (McKinney 2018). 
116 Id. The section states that the “attack[s] on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon underscore the compelling need for legislation,” but also mentions the 
attack that occurred on the Brooklyn Bridge. Id. 
117 Sam Roberts, How to Find the Bridge? First, Pay Your Respects, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 27, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/28/nyregion/28signs.html. 
118 Id. 
119 People v. Ferhani, No. 2461/11, 37 Misc. 3d 1232(A), 2012 WL 6554892, at *2 
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. June 25, 2012). 
120 People v. Morales, 20 N.Y.3d 240, 247, 982 N.E.2d 580, 584–85, 958 N.Y.S.2d 
660, 664–65 (2012). 
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American gangs.”121  This decision was based on the idea that the 
terrorism statute was not intended to reach “ ‘street crime’ and 
‘ordinary violent crime.’ ”122  The New York statute includes 
murder but does not indiscriminately extend the definition of 
terrorism to include every violent felony.123 
The New York statute effectively reaches crime that should 
be categorized as terrorism.  The wording of the statute allows 
the inquiry to focus on the intent of the defendant.124  Congress 
limited the federal statute to specific acts in fear that the 
definition of terrorism would be used indiscriminately,125 but the 
New York case law shows that expanding the actions that may 
constitute a crime of terrorism will not improperly encompass 
common criminal acts such as gang activity.126  Congress should 
expand the federal definition in order to allow the federal crime 
of terrorism to focus on the intent of the defendant because state 
laws cannot adequately address national security concerns. 
IV. THE FEDERAL CRIME OF TERRORISM STATUE NEEDS TO BE 
CHANGED 
This section suggests changing the intent requirement as 
well as adding both murder and hate crimes to the list of offenses 
under the current federal crime of terrorism.  State law 
enforcement cannot adequately address the threat posed by 
domestic extremists.  Although state laws may encompass 
extremist activity in ways that the federal code does not, state 
laws do not trigger the same investigatory mechanisms or send 
the same message.127  Federal agencies engage in information 
sharing and have investigatory powers that cross borders and 
allow for more cohesive and effective enforcement.  In addition, 
federal law often signals to states and citizens that a given policy 
is important and should be recognized broadly. 
The federal statute should allow the inquiry to focus on the 
intent of the defendant in determining whether the act 
constitutes a crime of terrorism; adding murder and hate crimes 
 
121 Id. at 246–47, 982 N.E.2d at 584, 958 N.Y.S.2d at 664. 
122 Id. at 249, 982 N.E.2d at 585–86, 958 N.Y.S.2d at 665–66 (quoting Linde v. 
Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 581 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)). 
123 Id., 982 N.E.2d at 586, 958 N.Y.S.2d at 666. 
124 Ferhani, 2012 WL 6554892, at *3. 
125 Buckman, supra note 114. 
126 Morales, 20 N.Y.3d at 249, 982 N.E.2d at 586, 958 N.Y.S.2d at 666. 
127 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 23. 
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would allow this to be the case.  The federal terrorism statutes 
need to target acts of violence intended to coerce or intimidate a 
civilian population or the government without an arbitrary 
distinction that leaves some mass murders being designated as 
terrorism while some are not even considered eligible for the 
designation.128 
A. Categorization of Terrorism Should be Based on Intent, Not 
Target or Method 
Categorizing an act as domestic terrorism should not hinge 
on whether the behavior or attempted action was in furtherance 
of one of the specific crimes listed in the statute.129  The inquiry 
should focus on whether or not the group or individual intended 
to intimidate or coerce a civilian population or unit of 
government.  Congress has reasons to deter the targeting of 
systems of transportation and government buildings, which the 
law will continue to do; however, the current manifestation of the 
statute leaves other vital institutions unprotected.  Targeting of 
schools is not listed in the federal crime of terrorism, nor are 
churches or places of public performances such as theaters.130   
The current categorization of terrorism focuses on a list of 
facilities that were brainstormed at the time of drafting.  The 
same can be said for the methods specified in the statute.  
Nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons can bring forth a 
catastrophic event, but the two most deadly terrorist attacks on 
United States soil since September 11, 2001 were carried out 
using means not listed under the federal crime of terrorism and 
that took place at locations not specifically listed in the statute.131  
The crime of terrorism should be an act intended “to intimidate  
 
 
 
 
 
128 United States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 517 (6th Cir. 2001). 
129 See United States v. Fidse, 778 F.3d 477, 481 (5th Cir. 2015); United States 
v. Awan, 607 F.3d 306, 314 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Ashqar, 582 F.3d 819, 
825 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 311 (4th Cir. 2008). 
130 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b(g)(5) (West 2015). 
131 See Michael S. Schmidt & Richard Pérez-Peña, F.B.I. Treating San 
Bernardino Arrack as Terrorism Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/05/us/tashfeen-malik-islamic-state.html; US 
Terrorist Attacks Fast Facts, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/18/us/u-s-terrorist-
attacks-fast-facts/index.html (last updated Mar. 1, 2018). 
412 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:393 
or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a unit of 
government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a 
unit of government” no matter what means are used.132 
B. Intent To Intimidate or Coerce a Civilian Population Should 
Be Included Within the Federal Crime of Terrorism 
The definition of both international terrorism and domestic 
terrorism include acts intended “to intimidate or coerce a civilian 
population.”133  This shows that terrorism does not necessarily 
have to target the government.  The federal crime of terrorism 
statute does not currently apply to acts that are intended to 
intimidate or coerce a civilian population.134  However, district 
courts are authorized to apply the domestic terrorism sentencing 
enhancement if the defendant commits a specified offense with 
the intent “to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, rather 
than to influence or affect the conduct of government by 
intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government 
conduct.”135  The federal crime of terrorism should not be limited 
to acts against the government.  Limiting the definition of the 
federal crime of terrorism to government targets creates 
confusion and incongruent definitions within the code. 
C. Including Murder in the Statute Will Shift the Inquiry to 
Focus on Intent 
Amending the statute to include murder as a specific act that 
may constitute the federal crime of terrorism to allow the inquiry 
to focus on whether or not the act was carried out with the 
intention to coerce or intimidate a civilian population or the 
government will eliminate the confusion associated with 
categorizing crimes as terrorism, and allow counterterrorism 
measures to be applied more thoroughly to domestic extremist 
groups.  This amendment would not target any group based on 
beliefs nor would it unreasonably expand the scope of the 
definition. 
 
 
132 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.25 (McKinney 2018). See generally D.C. Code Ann. 
§ 22-3152 (West 2001). 
133 See 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2012). 
134 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b(g)(5). 
135 United States v. Jordi, 418 F.3d 1212, 1216 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 9, at § 3A1.4 cmt. n.4). 
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Adding murder as a specific act that may constitute the 
federal crime of terrorism allows the categorization of terrorism 
to hinge on the intent of the defendant.  As seen under the D.C. 
terrorism statute, if an individual or group attacks innocent 
people in order to further his or her ideology, including murder 
as an offense will catch everything that truly falls within the 
definition.136  This includes the leftist extremists in D.C. as well 
as the right-wing extremist in Charlottesville.137  This 
amendment should not bring forth concern that the definition of 
terrorism will be unreasonably expanded either. 
The amendment will bring forth a more comprehensive 
definition of terrorism that does not leave the country debating 
over whether or not an act constitutes terrorism.138  The inquiry 
will focus on the intent of the defendant and not include acts that 
should not fall within the definition.  As seen under the New 
York statute, violence that is not intended to achieve one of the 
two specific outcomes associated with terrorism will not fall 
within the definition.139  Although gang activity and other 
senseless forms of violence are problems that need to be 
addressed, this amendment will not confer the label of domestic 
terrorism to every murder.  Terrorism should not become a 
phrase that is used “indiscriminately.”140  Notably, Professor 
Jesse J. Norris also suggested that murder should be included in 
the definition of terrorism in order to expand its application.141 
Although Norris offers respectable, intelligent changes to 
domestic terrorism law, if Congress changes the inquiry to 
whether the defendant had “the intent to advance, publicize or 
express an ideology” the courts will be left with more questions 
regarding what constitutes terrorism.142  The definition of 
terrorism should focus on whether the defendant intended to 
intimidate or coerce a civilian population or unit of 
government.143  This is a standard that courts are familiar with 
 
136 See D.C. Code Ann. § 22-3152(8) (West 2001); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, supra note 108. 
137 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 108; S.J. Res. 49, 105th 
Cong. (2017). 
138 Norris, supra note 72, at 292. 
139 People v. Morales, 20 N.Y.3d 240, 247–48, 982 N.E.2d 580, 584–85, 958 
N.Y.S.2d 660, 664–65 (2012). 
140 Buckman, supra note 114. 
141 See Norris, supra note 72, at 291. 
142 Id. at 292. 
143 See 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (2012). 
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and apply today.  It is also important to specify certain acts as 
federal crimes of terrorism in order to signal that certain entities 
and institutions need to be protected.  Furthermore, it is 
important for law enforcement to strongly monitor the purchase, 
sale, and development of explosives specified in the statute.  
Norris is right to say that murder needs to be included within the 
terrorism framework in order to “encompass an even larger 
proportion of terrorists,” but the changes suggested in this Note 
allow the existing framework to remain intact while 
accomplishing a similar goal.144  The current federal crime of 
terrorism reaches domestic acts, but adding murder as a 
specified act will bring forth a more evenhanded application of 
the framework. 
The term “terrorism” is disproportionately associated with 
Muslims, and Muslim communities feel the impact of that 
association.145  This has led to an egregious assumption that 
Islam is a religion filled with terrorists.146  Federal law should 
never apply disproportionately to any sect of the population 
whether it be based on religion, ideology, or race.  Members of 
Congress, federal agencies, and local law enforcement have 
acknowledged the risk presented by domestic extremists,147 but 
including murder specifically within the definition of the federal 
crime of terrorism will allow the threat to be addressed. 
Focusing the categorization of terrorism on the intent of the 
actor may be difficult because intent is hard to prove; however, 
the current statute already requires the intent to be present for 
an act to be considered a federal crime of terrorism.148  The 
current statute limits the application to certain acts specified in 
the statute, but commission of the act does not automatically 
categorize the act as a federal crime of terrorism.149  Under the 
 
144 Id.; see Norris, supra note 72, at 292. 
145 See Daniel Burke, The Secret Costs of Islamophobia, CNN (Nov. 15, 2016), 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/23/us/islamerica-secret-costs-islamophobia/index.html. 
“From 2001 to 2015, there were 2,545 anti-Islamic incidents targeting 3,052 
Muslims.” Id. (citing 2015 Hate Crime Statistics, FBI, https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-
crime/2015/tables-and-data-declarations/1tabledatadecpdf (last visited Aug. 18, 
2018)). 
146 See Burke, supra note 145. “Politicians have claimed that 85% of mosques 
are controlled by Islamic extremists and that Islam is a political system, not a 
religion, and thus not protected by the First Amendment.” Id.  
147 See generally S.J. Res. 49, 105th Cong. (2017); U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., supra note 102; KURZMAN & SCHANZER, supra note 55. 
148 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b(g)(5) (West 2015). 
149 Id. 
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suggested changes, murder will be added to the list so that, when 
carried out or attempted with the intent to intimidate or coerce a 
civilian population or the government, it will be eligible for the 
terrorism designation.  The intent requirement works as a 
safeguard to ensure this designation is not expanded 
indiscriminately.150 
D. Adding Hate Crimes to the Statute Will More Adequately 
Cover Extremist Activity 
Adding hate crimes as a specific act listed in the federal 
crime of terrorism statute will allow more acts perpetrated by 
domestic extremists to be categorized as terrorism and reinforce 
the notion that hate crimes are taken seriously by the federal 
government without eroding the need for hate crime statutes or 
indiscriminately expanding the federal terrorism framework.  
Hate crime statutes are an important part of the United States 
federal and state penal laws.  These statutes send a strong 
message that crimes motivated by bigotry will not be tolerated.151  
As discussed earlier, many violent acts by political extremists 
may constitute hate crimes because extremist violence often 
targets a specific group.152  Currently, the only groups whose 
conduct is adequately addressed by the terrorism framework are 
Islamic or anti-government extremists.153 
Adding hate crimes as a specific act listed in the federal 
crime of terrorism statute will bring racial, religious, and gender-
based violence within the terrorism framework when the 
requisite intent is also present.  This will allow for greater 
information sharing and investigations throughout the law 
enforcement community.  Currently, a hate crime can only be 
considered a federal crime of terrorism if it is carried out with a 
weapon of mass destruction or carried out at a particular 
facility.154  This is inadequate because hate crimes that are 
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intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population or the 
government can be carried out in a wide range of ways not listed 
in the statute.  When this intent is present, a hate crime should 
be considered terrorism under federal law. 
Placing hate crimes within the framework of terrorism will 
reinforce the idea that hate crimes are offenses that are equally 
as serious as terrorism.  As mentioned above, former Attorney 
General Loretta Lynch called hate crimes the “original terrorism” 
but acknowledged that a hate crime charge “may give the 
impression that the government ‘[does]n’t consider those crimes 
as serious.’ ”155  This impression is likely derived from the idea 
that “ ‘terrorism’ is a phrase that carries far-reaching 
connotations,”156 so when the Department of Justice seeks a hate 
crime conviction as opposed to a terrorist conviction, the public 
perceives the crime differently.157  Hate crimes should be viewed 
as incredibly serious offenses, especially when they are carried 
out with the intent required to be considered federal crimes of 
terrorism. 
Not all hate crimes will be considered acts of terrorism if 
these changes are implemented.  A hate crime can be carried out 
against an individual with no intent to target a population as a 
whole.  The act will not be considered a federal crime of terrorism 
if this intent is lacking.  There will still be a need for a robust 
hate crime statute that addresses and deters isolated incidents 
that do not reach the level of terrorism. 
Adding hate crimes as a specific act listed in the federal 
crime of terrorism statute will not indiscriminately expand the 
federal terrorism framework either.  As mentioned, the terrorism 
categorization will only be given when the requisite intent is 
found.158  Furthermore, hate crimes only prohibit willfully caused 
bodily harm.159  This “does not include solely emotional or 
psychological harm to the victim,”160 nor does it encompass 
thoughts, beliefs, or speech by the defendant.161  Placing hate 
crimes within the framework will only encompass willful bodily 
harm that includes the intent required under both the hate crime  
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157 See supra note 99. 
158 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b. 
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statute as well as the federal crime of terrorism statute, so there 
is no concern that this will impede constitutionally protected 
activity. 
E. Outlawing Material Support for Domestic Terror Groups 
Would be Unconstitutional 
Outlawing material support for a domestic terror group 
would be unconstitutional.  The federal government does not 
designate or publicly list domestic terrorist organizations.162  The 
federal government designates foreign terrorist organizations 
and that is the basis for the material support statute.163  This 
statute makes it illegal to provide financial aid or recruit on 
behalf of groups such as al-Qaeda.164  Even though creating a 
material support for domestic terror statute would likely be an 
effective measure for preventing violence,165 such a statute would 
likely be unconstitutional.166  It is not illegal to hold extremist 
beliefs or join most extremist groups due to First Amendment 
protections.167  It is, of course, illegal to plan or act violently 
based on those beliefs,168 but that conduct does not need a 
material support statute to be reached.  Therefore, a material 
support statute for domestic terrorism may be effective, but it 
likely would be unconstitutional. 
CONCLUSION 
Federal terrorism law does not adequately address the 
threat posed by domestic extremists.  The current law creates 
arbitrary lines that exclude some acts and include others without 
a focus on the intent of the defendant.  Amending the specific 
acts that constitute the federal crime of terrorism to include 
murder and hate crimes will sufficiently broaden the framework 
to reach domestic extremist groups without diluting the 
designation of terrorism or unconstitutionally limiting freedom of 
association.  Adding the intent to intimidate or coerce a civilian 
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population to the definition of the federal crime of terrorism will 
bring more congruence to the interpretation of the code as well as 
its enforcement.  Congress has called for the Executive Branch to 
target domestic extremists, but the legislature has the power to 
enact changes that will truly allow the threats to be addressed.  
These changes will also bring a more cohesive definition of 
terrorism and ease the misperceptions regarding Islam.  The 
current federal law surrounding terrorism creates confusion, one-
sided enforcement, and does not allow law enforcement to 
adequately address domestic extremist groups.  Congress must 
make these simple changes for the safety and security of the 
American public. 
